Richard Posner: A Friend to the Law, in Five Alcohol Cases
There are judges whose opinions supply an answer, and judges whose opinions also improve the reader’s understanding of the question. Richard Posner belonged in that second group. Following the news that he died on November 10, 2026, at 87, we have been thinking about what made his writing so valuable to lawyers, businesses and anyone trying to understand how law operates in the world. A friend to the law feels like the right way to remember him: a judge whose care for the law showed in the work he put into making its reasoning intelligible.
His alcohol cases offer a particularly good way to see that work. The industry puts government power, commercial incentives and private livelihoods into close contact, and a dispute over a license or a delivery rule can quickly become a dispute over something much larger. These five alcohol cases written by Richard Posner are worth revisiting for the questions they ask, the distinctions they preserve and the clear prose in which they do it. They also remind us that admiration for a judge can rest on the quality of his reasoning, including when a regulated business loses.
1. Club Misty: A liquor license deserves more than a popularity contest
In Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000), Chicago taverns challenged a procedure allowing precinct voters to revoke an individual establishment’s liquor license. This was different from a community’s general decision to prohibit liquor sales: the vote targeted particular licenses without a fair procedure for deciding whether revocation was warranted. Posner identified the defect plainly: “The challenged statute contains no safeguards against error.” Id. at 621. The court reversed the dismissal of the taverns’ due process challenge.
Then came the line that makes this opinion impossible to leave out: “Yet Socrates received more due process than the Tequila Roadhouse” (id. at 621). The comparison supplies the wit, but the absence of procedural protection supplies the constitutional problem. A liquor license may exist within a demanding regulatory system, yet its holder’s interest does not become disposable whenever neighbors are dissatisfied. The opinion gives a licensee’s livelihood the serious consideration an individualized exercise of government power requires, in language that does not demand a seminar in constitutional law.
2. Esmail: A liquor license is no license for a vendetta
That concern for the individual facing public power also shaped his earlier opinion in Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995). A Naperville liquor retailer alleged that the mayor pursued a campaign of licensing and police harassment while businesses with more serious violations received better treatment. These were allegations accepted as true at the dismissal stage, not findings that the mayor had committed the acts described. Posner explained why the complaint stated an equal protection claim: it alleged “a spiteful effort to ‘get’ him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.” Id. at 180.
The distinction matters because unequal enforcement does not necessarily turn every licensing dispute into a constitutional case. The pleaded campaign of irrational, personal retaliation supplied the additional concern here, and the court reversed the dismissal so the case could proceed. For anyone who represents a licensed business, the opinion captures something familiar: regulatory authority has an immediate effect on an owner’s ability to make a living. Posner took that practical vulnerability seriously while keeping the claim tied to the particular misconduct alleged.
3. Valley Liquors: What, exactly, is the injury to competition?
That same care with the individual dispute carried into the distribution network. In Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982), a wholesaler sought a preliminary injunction against a supplier’s reorganization under the antitrust laws. The wholesaler argued that being the supplier’s largest and lowest-priced distributor in the affected counties made it the best. Posner answered: “We follow the argument until ‘therefore.’” Id. at 743. The supplier could have independent reasons to favor distributors emphasizing something other than low prices and that doesn’t equate to the “best.”
His treatment of competition was equally careful: “We reject the casual equation of intrabrand price competition with interbrand competition.” Id. at 745. Competition among sellers of the same brand and competition among different brands required separate attention; the wholesaler’s loss of business did not complete that inquiry. The court affirmed the denial of preliminary relief on the record before it, leaving the ultimate merits for another day. That procedural limit is part of the opinion’s value: confident expression never excuses a reader from identifying the question actually decided.
4. Tippecanoe Beverages: Beer, money and responsibility for an agent
Once the distribution relationship is established, the next question may be who must answer when the transaction goes wrong. Tippecanoe Beverages, Inc. v. S.A. El Aguila Brewing Co., 833 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1987), involved an Indiana wholesaler that paid $12,960 for beer through an intermediary connected to a Spanish brewer. The beer never arrived, the intermediary disappeared and the brewer refused to deliver the beer or return the money. The brewer’s own words and conduct concerning the intermediary’s role mattered to whether it could be held responsible for the loss.
Posner explained that “the transaction (beer for money) was within the scope of a general agent’s authority.” Id. at 638. The court affirmed the judgment for the wholesaler, applying agency principles to the relationship the evidence showed. That does not turn every importer or distributor into a supplier’s agent; it makes the supplier’s representations about authority consequential. The opinion reminds us that the route a payment takes through a distribution arrangement does not, by itself, settle who might bear responsibility when the promised product never arrives.
5. Lebamoff (the first one a way way long time ago): Even a good challenge needs the right record
Delivery returned in a different form in Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc. v. Huskey, 666 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2012), where an Indiana retailer challenged restrictions on using common carriers to deliver wine to Indiana consumers. When we covered the decision in 2012, we highlighted Posner’s discussion of a potentially different challenge involving a carrier willing to meet the state’s training requirements. His observation about the case before him was spare: “No motor carrier is a party to this case.” Id. at 459.
The court rejected the retailer’s federal preemption and Commerce Clause challenges. On the latter, Posner emphasized that “No effect on interstate commerce has been shown”—a conclusion about this record rather than every alcohol delivery restriction. Id. at 462. Including this opinion matters because Posner’s method did not promise the industry a victory. He examined the asserted burdens, the regulatory justification and the parties before the court, then explained why this challenge failed. For a lawyer considering the next case, that attention to the missing party and missing proof remains an invitation to do the work more carefully.
A friend to the law
The lasting pleasure of these opinions is the sense of a mind working through a problem in full view of the reader. Posner asks us to examine an inference, notice a distinction and take seriously the consequences of the rule we would adopt. That is a demanding form of respect for lawyers and litigants, because it expects an argument to withstand scrutiny and gives them the reasoning needed to understand the result. For those of us who work in this corner of the law, these five decisions are one way to remember an extraordinary jurist whose writing still sharpens our thinking. A friend to the law leaves something useful for the people who come after him, and Judge Posner left us a great deal.







