BuzzBallz v. Big Sipz: Buy the Domain Before Your Competitor Does

Buy the domain before you file the trademark application or announce the beverage brand. Otherwise, your competitor might acquire it, redirect visitors to its own website, and answer your request for its return with “We will offer it to you for $1 B” and a laughing emoji. That happened in the BuzzBallz–Big Sipz fight. The web addresses eventually changed hands for free; the embarrassment earned a permanent place in a federal court opinion. (Order, pp. 3–5.)

In BuzzBallz, LLC v. MPL Brands NV, Inc., No. 24-cv-04004-EKL (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2026), Judge Eumi K. Lee eliminated the Big Sipz maker’s remaining cybersquatting and California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) counterclaims, ordering them “DISMISSED with prejudice in their entirety.” BuzzBallz had sued MPL Brands NV, Inc., doing business as Patco Brands, alleging that Big Sipz infringed its intellectual property and traded on its reputation. That underlying dispute continues toward trial. This ruling explains why Patco’s counterattack failed and what beverage manufacturers and wholesalers should learn from it. (Order, pp. 1, 19.)

Why the Big Sipz cybersquatting claim failed

Patco filed its intent-to-use trademark application on December 20, 2021. An unknown party registered bigsipz.com three days later. BuzzBallz purchased that domain on April 12, 2022, registered bigsipzcocktails.com around the same time, and redirected both to its own website. Founder Merrilee Kick explained the thinking: “Let’s mess with them a little bit.” BuzzBallz returned both domains for free in May 2022, months before the public sales described in the record. (Order, pp. 3–7.)

The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), requires more than an unwelcome domain registration. Along with a “bad faith intent to profit” and other elements, Patco needed a mark “distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name.” Its later trademark registration did not automatically establish that earlier distinctiveness. Although an intent-to-use application can establish priority upon eventual registration, the court rejected backdating the registration’s presumption of distinctiveness: “that presumption does not attach until the USPTO makes the registration decision.” Filing priority and the proof needed for this cybersquatting claim presented different questions. (Order, pp. 3, 5–6.)

Patco also offered a distributor presentation dated February 2022. The problem: “there is no evidence that Patco actually made this presentation to distributors or wholesalers in February 2022,” much less that it established distinctiveness. Marketing expenditures began later, and the first distributor purchase order arrived in November. A date on a slide deck proves considerably less than the person preparing the lawsuit might hope. Preserve the emails transmitting presentations, attendee records, actual advertising, purchase orders, and other evidence showing what reached the trade or public, and when. (Order, p. 7.)

The court resolved the ACPA claim on distinctiveness and expressly declined to reach BuzzBallz’s other arguments. The decision supplies no finding that calling the conduct a joke defeated bad faith. Nor did the ACPA claim require provable lost sales: the court noted that Patco could seek statutory damages if it established liability. Its separate UCL domain theory failed because the record lacked likely public deception and, as the court put it, “any material effect on Patco’s business, let alone an effect that significantly threatened competition.” (Order, p. 5 n.2, pp. 7, 9.)

The practical instruction could hardly come more directly from the bench: “trademark applicants can avoid this situation by registering a domain name before filing an intent-to-use application.” After clearing the proposed brand, secure the principal domain and sensible variants, place them in a company-controlled account, and assign responsibility for renewals. Coordinate that work with the trademark filing. We have discussed protecting beverage brands from domain-name abuse before; Big Sipz supplies a memorable reason to do the preventive work early. (Order, p. 6.)

Proving competitive harm from distributor pressure

The distribution allegations supplied equally lively reading. In discussing a proposed move to an Oregon distributor network, Kick wrote: “If they DROP selling Big Sipz FOR THE WHOLE STATE, and they can get every wholesaler to DROP BIG SIPZ, then I’ll move.” The court nevertheless found “no evidence that this arrangement actually materialized.” Patco also pointed to pressure on RNDC and Southern Glazers, but failed to connect those efforts to a demonstrated restriction on Big Sipz distribution. (Order, pp. 15–16 & n.11.)

For the competition theories Patco pursued, that gap mattered. The court emphasized that “[i]njury to a competitor is not equivalent to injury to competition.” California’s UCL can reach conduct that significantly threatens competition, including an incipient antitrust violation, but displeasing a rival does not supply the necessary showing. Big Sipz’s own expansion undermined its theory: by September 2025, it sold in every state except Utah and Mississippi. Asked to identify a distributor that carried Big Sipz and then dropped it, Patco’s witness answered, “No, I can’t think of any offhand, no.” (Order, pp. 8, 16–18.)

For manufacturers challenging exclusion, preserve the threat and document what followed. Obtain the buyer’s explanation, canceled orders, delisting notices, and sales records connecting the demand to lost access. Then assess the affected territory, duration, share of distribution, and commercially workable alternatives. Wholesalers receiving a demand to drop another brand should preserve the request, document their own decision and its reasons, and have counsel review the proposed restriction before agreeing. The court examined available distribution channels, the duration and terminability of restrictions, and actual competitive conditions; a hostile email could not supply all that evidence. (Order, pp. 14–18.)

Retailer-facing pressure also warrants a separate alcohol-law review. This order adjudicated Patco’s ACPA and UCL counterclaims; it did not resolve federal exclusive-outlet requirements under 27 U.S.C. § 205(a) or applicable state alcohol trade-practice rules. 

Calling the lawsuit a sham takes evidence too

Patco also attacked patent enforcement, coordinated litigation, and cease-and-desist letters. The court applied Noerr-Pennington protection to that litigation-related conduct. To invoke the sham exception here, Patco needed evidence that the litigation lacked any reasonable prospect of success and that BuzzBallz intended to use the litigation process itself as an anticompetitive weapon. The court found: “Patco offers no evidence on either element of the sham exception.” Instead, Patco cited an earlier brief that cited its own allegations. (Order, pp. 11–13.)

If a demand letter reaches your co-packer or distributor, keep the letter and preserve the product drawings, specifications, and communications needed to evaluate the asserted rights. If you plan to sue over the demand, identify the applicable immunity exception and obtain evidence supporting it. The court’s instruction to “go beyond the pleadings” captures the recurring problem throughout this opinion. A missing domain can create an expensive distraction, and a threatening email can justify serious investigation, but a successful counterclaim still needs proof of its legal elements. Start by buying the domain; that particular lesson should not require litigation. (Order, p. 13.)