When a legislature defines a word, courts should start with that definition. Justice Nicholas Bronni followed that approach in Arkansas’s Kirkland Signature distribution dispute, and his dissent got it right. The majority’s contrary reading allows one producer’s wholesaler appointment to control other producers’ distribution choices simply because their products share a name – even if that name is a private label. Suppliers and wholesalers now must plan around that holding, despite its flawed reasoning.
In Arkansas Wine & Spirits Wholesale, LLC v. Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration, 2026 Ark. 137 (Oct. 8, 2026), suppliers of Kirkland Chianti and Pinot Grigio appointed Moon Distributors. Later suppliers of Kirkland Sauvignon Blanc and strawberry margarita selected Arkansas Wine and Spirits. “The ABC approved these wholesaler designations,” but then required the later suppliers to request transfers to Moon, even though both “noted their preference for their original wholesaler choice, AWS.” Id. at 3.
The court’s majority upheld those transfers: “Once a manufacturer of a brand selects a wholesaler, other manufacturers of that brand must also designate that wholesaler.” Id. at 10. It accepted “good cause to grant the change request to comply with sections 3-2-401 and -403.” Id. A law protecting wholesaler exclusivity thus displaced a wholesaler that its suppliers still wanted.
The majority found “confusing and internally inconsistent legislative language,” then used dictionary definitions connecting “brand” with a trademark or distinctive name. Id. at 7–8. It relied on the statutory definition linking a brand label to a brand name, ABC regulations grouping derivatives and subcategories together and defining “product” broadly, and the legislative goal of preventing “undue control of such wholesalers by . . . manufacturers.” Id. at 8–9. It read “brand or label” in section 3-2-403 to require one wholesaler across Kirkland’s shared name. Id. at 10.
But, Justice Bronni’s dissent made the most sense and correctly started with the definition the legislature actually supplied. Section 3-2-412(c)(1) defines “brand,” for the entire subchapter, as “the same product or substantially the same product as evidenced by the product label that must be filed with the division.” Id. at 8; see id. at 13–14 (Bronni, J., dissenting). That definition governs section 3-2-403 too. Substituting a dictionary’s trademark meaning for the statutorily defined meaning of “brand” creates the very conflict the majority then invokes to justify departing from the text. Sharing a trademark does not make a Chianti and a strawberry margarita substantially the same product – and that certainly is not how Section 3-2-412 views it. You only get there by creating the ambiguity through ignoring Section 3-2-412’s definition and looking to a confusing and irrelevant dictionary definition.
Bronni’s reading also makes the registration and exclusivity provisions work together. Section 3-2-403 requires a federal certificate of label approval, or COLA, for each brand and brand extension, followed by a wholesaler designation for “such brand or label.” As Bronni explained, the record contained “multiple product-based COLAs—yet no single Kirkland Signature COLA.” Id. at 15 (Bronni, J., dissenting). The appointment should follow the product identified through that filing. This reading preserves exclusivity for the same or substantially similar products and their extensions without granting control over every distinct beverage carrying a common name.
The majority expressly stated, “We do not give special deference or weight to the agency’s determination.” Id. at 4. Nevertheless, its reliance on ABC’s regulations invites Bronni’s criticism: an agency’s rules cannot justify expanding the legislature’s definition. Nor should a general policy of protecting wholesalers override the product-based language the legislature chose. Bronni’s approach gives the definition, registration requirement, and exclusive appointment consistent effect. The majority’s approach gives the common trademark priority over that statutory structure.
For suppliers and brand owners, the holding requires checking the entire shared brand’s Arkansas registration history before promising distribution rights. Identify appointments made by other producers and obtain any relevant releases. Private-label and trademark-license agreements should assign responsibility for coordinating registrations and prohibit conflicting appointments without agreed approval. If the proposed wholesaler differs from the existing designee, address the regulatory change process before committing to the launch. The majority expressly recognized that manufacturers “can petition the ABC Division for a change.” Id. at 9. A contractual promise cannot substitute for that process.
Wholesalers should investigate the same history before spending on inventory or launch efforts. Obtain disclosures about other producers using the brand and their distributors, then compare the contractual grant with applicable exclusivity rules. An incumbent should investigate whether new products implicate its existing rights; a newcomer should not treat initial agency approval as conclusive. Negotiate responsibility for stranded inventory, agreed launch expenses, and cooperation in regulatory proceedings if conflicting appointments prevent continued distribution, while preserving statutory remedies.
Bronni supplied the sounder interpretation, but the majority supplied Arkansas’s governing rule. Suppliers and wholesalers should preserve the dissent’s arguments when seeking legislative clarification or litigating comparable language elsewhere, while structuring current Arkansas wine and spirits arrangements around the holding.