Maryland’s Direct Beer Shipping Case Puts Granholm-Type Manufacturer Issue on Trial
A Manufacturer’s Fight, Not a Retailer’s
On August 4, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland refused to grant summary judgment in Furlong v. Brown, sending the case to a bench trial. The plaintiffs—two out-of-state breweries (Varietal Beer Co. from Washington, Vortex Brewing from Pennsylvania) and a Maryland consumer—are not fighting for retailer shipping privileges.
They are fighting for the right to deliver beer directly to Maryland consumers as manufacturers. That makes this case look more like Granholm v. Heald, where wineries challenged laws granting direct shipping rights only to in-state producers, than the wave of retailer shipping cases like B-21 Wines, Day v. Henry, or Jean-Paul Weg.
Maryland’s Law and Its Residency Barrier
Maryland’s 2024 Direct Shipping Act carved out a direct-to-consumer privilege for breweries—but only for those holding:
Both licenses require Maryland residency. The Alcoholic Beverages and Cannabis Article flatly states that a manufacturer license applicant must be a Maryland resident (or, for an entity, have a resident qualifying officer/partner) at the time of application and for the duration of the license. Without residency, a brewery cannot get the manufacturer license. Without the manufacturer license, it cannot get the Class 7 wholesaler license. Without both, it cannot get the direct beer delivery permit.
Even for qualifying in-state breweries, the Act imposes an employee-only delivery rule—requiring staff to hand the beer to the consumer in person. No FedEx, no UPS, no third-party couriers.
The Legal Challenge
Count I – The residency-based licensing scheme discriminates on its face against out-of-state breweries, shutting them out of the direct delivery market entirely.
Count II – The employee-only delivery rule discriminates in effect by making the privilege impractical for any brewery without an in-state physical presence.
The Court Followed Tennessee Wine’s Burden Allocation
One notable aspect of Judge Bennett’s opinion: he followed what many see as the correct post-Tennessee Wine approach. Once a plaintiff shows discrimination, the burden shifts to the state to prove—with concrete evidence—that the law is either:
- An essential feature of the state’s alcohol regulatory system, or
- Justified by a legitimate non-protectionist public health or safety interest.
The court did not let Maryland off the hook with speculation. Instead, it set the case for trial so Maryland will have to back its claims with facts. That is exactly the kind of evidentiary burden-shifting Tennessee Wine requires.
Delivery vs. Shipment: A Constitutional Fault Line
The statute also draws a critical distinction between delivery and shipment:
- Delivery: The brewery’s own staff hands the beer to the consumer, after verifying age and (per state training) sobriety.
- Shipment: The brewery sends the beer by common carrier. Maryland’s statute bans this outright for all breweries, regardless of location.
That means even in-state producers with direct-to-consumer privileges cannot simply “ship” beer; they must use employees to deliver it. For constitutional analysis, this raises a separate question: can Maryland justify forcing a labor-intensive, in-person handoff instead of allowing shipment through regulated carriers?
How the Court Treated the Manufacturer Context
Despite the fact that Furlong involves producer-level privileges—squarely in Granholm territory—the court did not analyze it differently from a retailer-privilege challenge – the type that have been a staple post-Tennessee Wine. It applied the same Tennessee Wine two-step, cited Granholm as part of the nondiscrimination backdrop, and left any deeper manufacturer/retailer distinction for trial.
That trial now becomes the opportunity for plaintiffs to argue that residency barriers and delivery restrictions on manufacturers should face the same rigorous scrutiny Granholm (or rather a Granholm analysis as modified by Tennesee Wine) applied to winery shipping bans.
Why the Court Didn’t Rule Now
And this is important as these are the standards parties should look to in similar cases to determine whether they have adequately proved through affidavits, depositions or other factual matter when moving for summary judgment on these issues: The record was skeletal. Both sides agreed there were no disputed facts, but they submitted only eight exhibits—leaving out four main points that forced the Court to state the dearth of information required more:
1. Evidence on how Maryland’s three-tier system operates.
2. Comparisons to other states.
3. Analysis of less discriminatory alternatives.
4. Administrative data on direct beer delivery permits.
Without a developed record, the court refused to rule on the merits and instead scheduled a bench trial.
Why This Case Matters
This is not another retailer shipping case. It’s a Granholm-style fight over a state:
- Reserving direct-to-consumer privileges for in-state manufacturers through a residency requirement, and
- Narrowing the privilege by banning shipment and forcing in-person delivery by employees.
The court’s choice to follow Tennessee Wine and place the burden on Maryland to prove its justifications means the trial will hinge on whether the state can substantiate public health, safety, or other legitimate goals—and whether those interests truly require residency barriers and an employee-only delivery mandate.
