Lite vs Light in Beer: Why Two 7th Circuit Cases Keep the Terms Fair Game
September marks the anniversary of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Miller v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., decided on September 6, 1979. That ruling, together with the earlier Miller v. Heileman decision from 1977, locked in the principle that no brewer owns “light” or “lite.” These cases preserved industry-wide freedom to describe beer in plain English and clarified doctrines that still shape trademark law today.
We wanted to revisit them now—as we pass Schlitz’s anniversary—as a reminder of why every brewer can call a beer “light” or “lite” without fear of trademark exclusivity, and why these opinions remain touchstones in alcohol advertising and trademark jurisprudence.
Miller v. G. Heileman, 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977)
Miller Brewing Co. purchased the LITE brand from Meister Brau in 1972. Meister Brau first marketed LITE beer in 1967 and secured registrations in 1968, but only for “beer with no available carbohydrates,” because the Patent Office viewed “LITE” as otherwise merely descriptive. Miller poured millions into advertising, turned Miller Lite into a national phenomenon, and grew sales from 50,000 barrels in 1973 to 4 million by 1976.
When G. Heileman introduced its own “Light” beer, Miller sued and won a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court explained:
“Because ‘light’ is a generic or common descriptive word when applied to beer, neither that word nor its phonetic equivalent may be appropriated as a trademark for beer.”
The opinion walked through the Abercrombie spectrum—generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary/fanciful—and placed “light” firmly in the generic/common descriptive category when used with beer. Dictionaries, industry publications, and even state statutes recognized “light beer” as a standard term.
The court stressed that secondary meaning never rescues a generic word and that misspelling changes nothing:
“Using the phonetic equivalent of a common descriptive word, i.e., misspelling it, is of no avail.”
Miller could still protect its trade dress and brand identity—but the word “light” and its phonetic equivalent belonged to everyone.
Miller v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1979)
Miller also pursued Schlitz over “Schlitz Light.” Schlitz—already an amicus in Heileman—answered with collateral estoppel, arguing that Miller already lost the “light” trademark fight. The district court agreed, canceled Miller’s registrations, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed:
“Two years ago we reversed a preliminary injunction order … because ‘light’ is a generic or common descriptive word when applied to beer, neither that word nor its phonetic equivalent may be appropriated as a trademark for beer.”
The court held that Heileman’s interlocutory ruling carried preclusive effect because it identified an “insuperable obstacle” to Miller’s claims: once “light” counts as generic, Miller cannot prevail—against anyone.
For legal geeks, this opinion carried the added bonus of leaning on not one, but two of Judge Friendly’s most influential decisions. On the trademark side, the Seventh Circuit noted that both parties accepted Judge Friendly’s framework in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976), as the controlling taxonomy of generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary marks. And on the procedural side, the court quoted directly from Judge Friendly’s Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. opinion, which explained:
“Whether a judgment, not ‘final’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, ought nevertheless be considered ‘final’ in the sense of precluding further litigation of the same issue, turns upon such factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review. ‘Finality’ in the context here relevant may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.”
And a Learned Hand Bonus!
But wait… there’s more. The panel also addressed Judge Learned Hand’s famous dictum in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. that whether a word is generic depends on what “buyers understand by the word.” But the Seventh Circuit limited that principle in clarifying the circumstances of Hand’s reasoning:
“When Judge Learned Hand said that whether a word is generic depends on what ‘buyers understand by the word,’ he was referring to a coined word for a commercial product that was alleged to have become generic through common usage. He was not suggesting that the meaning of a familiar, basic word in the English vocabulary can depend on associations the word brings to consumers as a result of advertising.”
That distinction mattered. Hand’s test works for coined terms like “aspirin” or “cellophane” that slid into generic use, but advertising can’t turn a dictionary word like “light” into a private trademark. (These are fun to think of: Bandaid, Escalator, Kleenex, Taser… maybe Google?)
The court also rejected Miller’s unfair competition theory, finding that “Schlitz Light Beer” clearly identified Schlitz as the source. After all, it is called SHLITZ Light Beer
Why These Cases Still Matter
- Generic terms stay public
Everyday descriptors—like “light”—remain free for all brewers. Trademark law protects distinctive brands, not ordinary vocabulary. - Collateral estoppel promotes finality
Schlitz shows how a genericism ruling blocks endless litigation. Once an appellate court brands a word generic, the issue ends for everyone.
Proof of Doctrinal Strength: From Friendly & Hand to Calabresi
I honestly cannot make this stuff up. The Schlitz opinion’s reliance on Friendly and its careful engagement with Hand underscore its intellectual heft. But the ultimate confirmation came when Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit later cited these rulings in Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co. (Honey Brown).
Calabresi wrote:
“When a producer creates a new product that differs from an established product class in a particular characteristic, the law of trademark will not grant the producer the exclusive right to label its product with words that are necessary to describe that new characteristic.”
That reasoning tracked the Miller cases—ensuring “Honey Brown” for ales stayed descriptive just as “light” had for beers. When Friendly, Hand, and Calabresi all appear in the same doctrinal conversation, you know the law rests on solid ground.
